

THE GRAMSCI MONUMENT- NEWSPAPER



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
July 21st, 2013 - Forest Houses, Bronx, NY

"A periodical, like a newspaper, a book, or any other medium of didactic expression that is aimed at a certain level of the reading or listening public, cannot satisfy everyone equally; not everyone will find it useful to the same degree. The important thing is that it serve as a stimulus for everyone; after all, no publication can replace the thinking mind."
- Antonio Gramsci (Prison Notebook 8)



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Stanley Aronowitz



**Popular Education
In a time of struggle**

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
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Bronx, NY 10456

Sunday
Chance of Storm

90 °F | °C

Precipitation: 20%
Humidity: 52%
Wind: 10 mph



A TEXT FROM STANLEY ARONOWITZ

SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The strength of social movements since World War II, and their separation from the conventional labor and socialist movements, has generated a new branch in the social sciences that has attempted to theorize their advent as distinct from the labor and class questions. Social movement theory accepts both a pluralist and consumerist framework for these struggles. One strand, associated with Talcott Parsons, subsumed these movements under the rubric of collective behavior, a phrase that recalls Gustav LeBon's studies of the crowd or Freud's group psychology, both of which view mass upheavals as episodic outbursts of rage or as dangerous deviations from prevailing so-

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the sites of their analysis are the workplace and the unions. They rarely address such issues as inadequate housing, the poor education blacks and other minorities suffer, abortion, or the so-called double shift of home and paid work most women endure. Nor do writers on the labor movement generally address environmental concerns or problems of the physically and mentally disabled within the framework of class analysis. Thus the divide between social movements and class is deeply embedded in recent labor studies as well.

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's influential *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1987) raised the theoretical and political stakes of social movement theory by linking the emergence of the movements to the critique of marxist class reductionism and proposing a new paradigm of historical transformation in which the centrality of class and class struggle is explicitly abandoned. The tacit presupposition of previous theory that social movements were historically and logically separate from labor and class are accorded philosophical and theoretical status by Laclau and Mouffe. In effect, they codify the proposition that class is an expired social category and that the new social movements in which bio-identities are at the core marked a crucial shift. Following Michel Foucault's conception according to which language and discourse rather than the mode of material production and class relations constitute the sinews of social power, they go so far as to suggest that social relations (by which they invariably signify economic relations)—indeed, even the concept of the social as such—be abandoned or understood as derivative of the conflation of power and knowledge. But the authors go further and declare the divergence of the aims of the new social movements from those of the labor and socialist movements. In effect, they argue that the working class and its unions and political parties have been more or less permanently integrated into the power system. In their critique of the European and Latin American Communist movements that dominated Left politics until the collapse of the Soviet Union, they insist that "Socialism" should no longer be comprehended within leninist categories such as revolutionary dictatorship led by the working class, which was a bedrock of Communist ideology.

Reflecting their evaluation of the bankruptcy of the leading parties of socialism, the authors counterpose the strategy of "radical democracy" that they attribute to the new social movements. But it is never clear what they mean by radical democracy. They are unable to advance specific proposals because their theory presupposes the highly centralized institutional structures of European states. For the most part, radical democracy signifies to them struggles for space for marginal formations within the sphere of "civil

cial norms. Following Max Weber's concept that classes or social formations that contest existing institutional power arrangements are contingent and temporary, the collective behavior school views movements in terms of action by a particular group around specific grievances; for the most part these movements are sporadic and disappear when their goals have been reached. Parents succeed or fail to change a school policy; neighbors organize to prevent city government from agreeing to the plans of a supermarket chain to establish a store with a huge parking lot in their community that will cause congestion and displace small proprietors who are willing to give credit; or workers may break a contractual prohibition against strikes and walk off the job to protest management's discharge of a fellow worker. These fights may be fierce and even politically consequential. Accordingly, when movements become organizations with bylaws and elected officers, they cease to be movements and take their place in the pluralist polity as just another interest group.²⁴

But by the early 1960s, the emergence of mass national student, anti-war, and the black freedom movements produced more sophisticated conceptualizations by Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, William Gamson, Alberto Melucci, Meyer Zald, and James McCarthy, among others. Reflecting their view that class and class struggle had either disappeared or was in abeyance in the wake of the political and economic entente between large fractions of the working class and their unions and the prevailing system, these writers tended to reify the break between labor and social movements. They define social movements in terms of physical identities such as race and sex and communities of interest grounded in common geographic space, profession, generation, or ideological perspectives. Even if they become important political and social forces they are not conceived in terms of challenging or changing prevailing power arrangements but are ultimately consonant with interest groups, as defined by pluralist political theory. Movements succeed or fail according to criteria of whether they can mobilize resources: for example, recruit a mass membership, gain media attention, acquire funds, and attract coalition partners to advance their aims. But for most writers the basic objectives of social movements are not linked to the class affiliations of their constituents.²⁵

Social movements and class theory mirror each other. Despite the many rich descriptions of the practices of social movements, not only do the categories of political economy disappear in the discourse of social movement theory, but so do questions of structural power. Most writers on the labor movement may factor race and sex into their accounts of labor struggles, but

society," a sphere which, in its Gramscian locution, is located between the economy and the state, the space of voluntary social organizations and institutions like schools. But whereas Gramsci's politics was anchored in the struggles of the working class and argued that its achievement of ideological hegemony within cultural spheres such as education and literature as much as in politics entailed the proposal of a new "common sense" in which the social question—by which he meant issues of economics, politics, and culture—is moved to the center of political discourse, Laclau's and Mouffe's proposal entails the displacement of existing "hegemonies" of Labor and capital. Their attempt to suggest a new common sense is a radically decentered ideological field in which no particular interest save that of democracy can be said to have priority.²⁶

In the 1990s, in the wake of the collapse of Soviet Communism, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* became a standard reference for many intellectual radicals—academics and those within the new social movements, especially feminists, sexual freedom activists, and those concerned with reforming the prison system and other disciplinary institutions such as the schools. Laclau and Mouffe seemed to confirm the autonomy of social movements, the validity of struggles at the margins and of so-called marginal people. At the same time, in concert with Foucault's thesis, power was to be found everywhere but was most evident in the body, which encapsulated the displacement of class by bio-identities. In this they were among the social theorists, including, prominently, Judith Butler and Joan Scott, who gave new conceptual weight to identity politics.²⁷ History, indeed the past, could now be viewed as irrelevant when not destructive of the new formations. And while the authors were ostensibly indebted to the marxist tradition insofar as they retained some kind of socialist framework and asserted their affiliation with the work of Antonio Gramsci, for example, the effect of their postmodern theory was to provide a new version of political liberalism. For by affirming the primacy of human rights and by their renunciation of class formation and class struggle they had deprived themselves and the movements they extolled of the levers of power, except those of incremental reform. Moreover, by renouncing class analysis and substituting the indeterminate plurality of struggles based largely on bio-identities, they were unable to answer the question, What issues are worth fighting for?

Laclau and Mouffe are only among the most prominent of those who have told only half the story. Surely the accumulated events marking the gulf separating workers' movements from the autonomous social movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were nothing short of a

tragedy. The breach deprived both movements of the possibility of forging an alliance that could redefine freedom and effectively contest power. The workers' movements in the United States were damaged by this rift as much as the social movements. For example, when the alliance between a segment of organized Labor and capital began to unravel in the 1970s, the choice Labor had made after World War II to buy into the Cold War and into America's global expansion rather than to take the alternate path of opposition was so deeply ingrained in its institutional predispositions that the concept, let alone the practice, of forging relations with the burgeoning student, feminist, and the more militant wing of the black freedom movements was inconceivable. Except for a relatively small corps of progressive trade unionists and some of the newly organized public employees' unions, which were more sympathetic to feminism and to war opponents because many of their constituents were in the ranks of these movements, the mainstream of American Labor either sat out the 1960s or actively sided with the government and corporations in promoting war aims and, in consequence, fought against protesters. Equally important, organized Labor remained a bastion of conventional morality in the face of the emergence of the visible demands for sexual freedom by women and gays. And under the sign of saving jobs many unions responded to ecological efforts to limit the scope of despoliation of the natural environment by making alliances with their own employers. Even as the AFL-CIO joined forces with the liberal wing of the civil rights movement to advance its legislative program, Labor viewed the sit-ins, freedom rides, and other direct actions to break segregation with suspicion and antagonism. As a result, in the 1960s the gulf separating labor from the leading militant social movements became wider.

Even in retreat the unions clung to the fig leaf of class compromise rather than forging a bloc that could challenge and contest power. When the social contract it had entered with capital after the war was unilaterally abrogated, organized Labor found itself with few allies. Its isolation combined with a mentality that stubbornly clung to the all-but-destroyed postwar arrangements placed the unions in a defensive and increasingly conservative posture. As we have seen, in the 1980s unions entered into concessionary agreements that transferred the burden of the effects of global economic stagnation and crisis from employers to workers and, for the most part, responded repressively to rank-and-file attempts to resist this transfer. The mantra of union leadership was that in the face of economic turbulence saving jobs was the first priority. On the shop floor decades of gains in imposing

scheduled for fall announced by opponents of the neoliberal policies of the IMF and the WB; but the War Against Terrorism resulting from the September 11 events prompted cancellation of its plans to participate in the protests.

It remains to be seen whether unions can recover from decades of class compromise and political distance from the Left. At a time when globalism signifies, in the first place, massive new enclosures, that is, the displacement of hundreds of millions of people from the land and from the factories; a time when sections of the labor movements of advanced industrial societies, including those in the United States, are for the first time in nearly a century beginning to recognize the urgent need for international solidarity among all who oppose multinational corporate and state power, the hegemonic status of identity politics within social and political discourse transformed the "social" question, which has historically denoted the struggle for the emancipation of labor from class exploitation, into a question of identity. Now the worker becomes only one among the plurality of identities arrayed throughout the cultural and political field with no particular privileged position with respect to historical transformation. With Foucault many argue that history may not be understood in terms of stages or of successive modes of production but should be conceived as a series of discontinuous "discursive formations" marked by specific configurations of knowledge/power. So knowledge, not labor, becomes the linchpin of power.²⁹

In turn, postmodern and poststructuralist thought deconstructs the goal of "emancipation" by showing that those who adhere to this goal are infected with the virus of essentialism. Since they are anticipatory concepts and, in traditional social theory, connote a preconceived goal of social struggles, independent of the actual course of these struggles, those who invoke emancipation, liberation, and freedom in relation to workers and other social movements are condemned for utopianism, or harkening back to the tragic experience of Communism, many now agree with Isaiah Berlin the idea of "positive" freedom is inherently authoritarian. Many of these persuasions do not hesitate to conflate utopianism—indeed, the centrality of the labor question—with Stalinism and other heinous versions of Marxism.³⁰ As a result, we have experienced a weird convergence of some of radical postmarxian philosophy and social theory with conventional liberalism; like the trajectory of a good portion of literary radicals after World War II some have found themselves verging on neoconservatism or Right libertarianism.

contractual and informal limitations on the authority of management to set production norms, introduce labor-saving technologies, and control work environments with respect to health and safety were frequently given up in return for job security agreements.

But as collective bargaining turned into collective begging, the hard-won democratic character of the unions eroded as well. Unions that could no longer deliver in the pay envelope and had surrendered power on the shop floor attempted to retain membership loyalty by transforming themselves into organizations that dispensed members' services. The tendency toward the clientization of union members, already incipient in the bureaucratization of labor organizations—in which full-time staff rather than shop floor leaders effectively ran the union—became the norm in many public and service employees organizations; the proud democracies that had been established in many industrial unions during the organizing phase either disappeared or were watered down. Unions' constitutions mandated less frequent conventions and elections of officers. Rebellious local unions were often slapped with trusteeships that temporarily abrogated the prerogatives of their leadership. And even if these local unions were not taken over, international union auditing departments oversaw their funds, not only to detect corrupt practices but to restrict their autonomy.²⁸


At the political level unions became even more dependent upon the Democratic Party and the liberal state, so that no calumny visited upon workers and their unions by Democratic administrations was too harsh to prevent the leadership from giving its wholehearted support to the dominant centrist wing of the party. Taken for granted as a political ally, with only tiny exceptions Labor's legislative program during the last four Democratic administrations remained unadopted by Democratic—as well as Republican-controlled Congresses. Organized labor was not outraged by Bill Clinton's decision to give the full weight of his administration to supporting free trade agreements such as NAFTA and the WTO; and when the president agreed to sign the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, the new, progressive AFL-CIO leadership under John Sweeney failed to raise its voice in dissent or mobilize its legions of activists and rank-and-file members. In the aftermath of the disappointing political defeat of its candidate for president in the elections of 2000, there were signs that Sweeney was toying with a new strategy. In spring 2001, the AFL-CIO executive council announced a new policy of nonpartisanship that implied it would support worthy Republicans. A few months later organized Labor formally endorsed a new round of protests

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THOMAS HIRSCHHORN TEXT
WITH JACQUES RANCIÈRE

CONVERSATION

PRESUPPOSITION OF THE EQUALITY OF INTELLIGENCES
AND LOVE OF THE INFINITUDE OF THOUGHT



Jacques Rancière

Philosopher

Dear Jacques Rancière,

I am happy to have the opportunity to write you. I'd like to suggest that I begin our exchange by sharing with you some experiences I had during *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*, my latest work in the public space, conceived for and with the inhabitants of an outlying neighbourhood of Amsterdam in 2009.

I thought that sharing an experience, an experience I had thanks to my work, was a good starting point. *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* is a work of art conceived according to the "Presence and Production" guideline: my presence and production as an artist, but also that of Vittoria Martini, as an ambassador, that of Marcus Steinweg, as a philosopher, and that of Alexandre Costanzo, as an editor.

"Presence and Production" is my own term, a guideline I created to define those of my works that require my presence and production during the entire duration of an exhibition. With this term "Presence and Production," I want to put forward my own notions because I think I can assess what is involved in being responsible for "Presence" and "Production." I can understand what it will require of me. However, I do not know what "community Art," "participative Art," "educational Art," and "relational aesthetics Art" mean. With the "Presence and Production" guideline, my aim is to answer the following questions: can a work-through the notion of "Presence," my own presence—create for others the conditions for being present? And can my work-through the notion of "Production"—create the conditions for other productions to be established?

Over the three months of *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*, I noticed something that was new, unexpected, and surprising to me: the first local inhabitants to come to *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* were inhabitants of the margins, on the margins of the neighbourhood and undoubtedly of society. From the beginning, these inhabitants visited my work regularly and soon came every day. Of all the visitors, these were the ones who stayed the longest. As the first from the neighbourhood, they really involved themselves, yet they were all people on the margins.

Over time, they formed a kind of "hard core" of *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*. Most of these people were isolated and did not know each other before the festival—or if so, barely. They often lived alone, had family issues, problems with work or were unemployed or disabled or had an awful lot of problems.

Their presence—which was lively and often funny—made me happy at once. I was simply happy because there was "Presence." These first inhabitants to confront my work were not the family people, employees, workers, and members of associations, those who are generally "active." On the contrary, they were those who are generally "inactive." I had hoped and worked for a few people in the Bijlmer neighbourhood to share their time with me, but I had not anticipated it would be these inhabitants!

With time, I understood why they were the first—the pioneers—to get involved with and in my work. They all had something: free time, "too much time," and thus time to kill. I was moved by this realisation—for I became aware that my "Presence and Production" guideline had provoked something and that from hereon out we would share this thing: time passing. These first inhabitants had time, lots of free time to come into contact with my work. And I, present all day throughout the exhibition, had time to come into contact with them. I asked myself the question: could it be because I am also on the margins? Don't I have to be, as an artist? Will I ever have to stop being on the margins?

Being on the margins was what we had in common, what we could share, and also understand—understand thanks to art. I felt there was an equality between these inhabitants with too much time and me and my precarious project. The fact that we were present on site was the thing to be shared, it was our "common good." With its "Presence and Production" guideline, *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* offered a focus point. It was a powerful experience for me that those who first took hold of it were those who do not have moments and spaces to enjoy in their daily lives. Was *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* able to create a space, a time and a moment of public space thanks to the presence of the work itself but also that of all the participants—including me? A new space in which "excess time" could crystallise and take shape?

The "Presence and Production" guideline allowed me to understand the relationship to the margins as a common good constituting an exchange. And what if this connection with the margins and the precarious opening that results was the key to coming into contact with the other? Is this precarious relationship dense enough to create a real event?

The notion of "Presence and Production," which I intended as a challenge, a "warlike" affirmation but also a gift—an offensive and even aggressive gift—has taken on a new meaning for me. The formula "Presence and Production" has taken on the dimension of a different and specific power. I thought I had an experience that means something to me, isn't that the experience of art?
Thomas Hirschhorn

Dear Thomas Hirschhorn,
Sadly, I wasn't able to participate in the experience of *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival*. I am sorry for that. I will therefore try to answer based on what you tell me, on what I know of your previous work and on my own concerns. The first thing I hear in "Presence and Production" is the sign of equality represented by "and." Equality between two modes of presence that are commonly opposed: the presence of the work of art as a result of the artist's work, offered to viewers, and the presence of the artist as bearer or initiator of an action. Relational art has claimed to substitute the creation of relationships implying an interaction for the presence of the work of art before the viewer. Activist art claimed to demystify the myth of the artist by advocating an art that has become action. For my part, I've always argued that under the guise of demystification these strategies merely radicalised the traditional figure of the artist by avoiding him the task of relinquishing a product of his work, of separating it from his relationship to himself, to give it over to the examination but also to the temporality of others. There is no art without a production which we give the viewer the means to approach and appropriate within a temporality other than the artist's. "Presence and Production" would then mean two things at once: that the artist exposes himself to being objectified as a producer whose productions are judged by all, but also that the artist is there, not being the work of art himself, but answering for what he has done and answering to those who react to his apparatus by adopting their time. This means, I think, that the artist's presence is not that of an entertainer. This point probably needs to be clarified. If I understand correctly, this festival had in common with events you've organised in the past under other names (monument, precarious museum, "24 hours") the joining of a work of visual art with a series of activities ranging from philosophy conferences and open reading areas to theater and creative activities for local children. How exactly would you define the difference between this apparatus and those for debates, publications, workshops, and various activities put in place by biennales and other events of the same type or even simply by museums for exhibitions? Is it the very fact that in your case there is not the usual separation between artistic production and a series of actions intended to make its meaning resonate or to create media impact among the general public? Is that also what "Presence" means, given that what you do is something other than creating a public venue or organising interactions?
The first element of an answer to this question of presence comes in terms of time: the equality "Presence and Production" would also be a sign of equality placed between heterogeneous times. This has no direct relationship, but I'm reminded of what Pedro Costa says about his work as a filmmaker, shooting in "Vanda's room" over two years, going every day, the way you'd go to the office, to see these "margin-dwellers" whose time is more than fluctuant. Many artists and various types of activists want to make people "active" by identifying activity with mobility. They want to make them move off the seat they're sitting on, force them to talk when they feel like watching, listening, or keeping quiet. This view of the meaning of activity is far too simple. Let's not forget that those we once referred to as "active citizens" and "men of leisure" were one and the same while "passive" citizens were those whose time was occupied by manual activities. Privilege can be expressed by opposite qualities—activity or idleness—but its core is the disposal of time. The artist's approach to equality is thus the ability to adapt his time to the time of those who do not "possess" time, those whose fate is always to have too much or not enough time.
"Too much" or "not enough" time determines the politics of art. In the past, when we worked to bring art closer to the people, we wanted to bring it closer to those whose work did not leave them enough time: not enough time to live within art, not enough time to travel far enough to get to know it. This entailed a certain economy to concentrate the art-effect. With the Bijlmer experience, you point out an opposite phenomenon: those who were involved in the experience are those who have too much time, those whose time is not taken up by work. Should we call them margin-dwellers and imagine a community between the artist and them as a shared position on the margins? I don't like this notion much, both because it threatens to raise certain stereotypes of the artist and to simplify the relationship of the work to its absence, of occupied time with idle time. The general phenomenon revealed by these kinds of experiences is the presence of powerful investments for knowledge, thought, art, and any experience of this type in places where they aren't expected, among individuals whose business they aren't supposed to be. It has often been noted that the presence of time made available by force helps: prison provides more time to think and learn than the factory or the office; being in psychiatric institutions has provided a certain number of people with the time to explore their dramatic possibilities etc. But more generally, it is the porosity of the dividing line, the fact of circulating between occupied time and idle time that defines a type of experience that was largely present in yesterday's proletarian world but has been made more perceptible by all the current forms of precariousness and intermittence. The "Presence"

this fluctuating temporality by confronting both his own work with other experiences of work and his available time with other available times. Making different times equal is in fact the condition for a public space, that is to say a space affirming anybody's ability to see, produce, and think, to be created. The political power of art, rather than being in teaching, demonstrating, provoking, or mobilising, is in its ability to create public spaces thus conceived.

Jacques Rancière

Dear Jacques Rancière,

Thank you very much for your answer, which raises four points to which I'd like to respond: the question of the artist as an entertainer, the difference between my work and a cultural event, the question of "participative art" in general and finally the question concerning the position of the margin and the stereotypes of the artist. Yes, the artist's presence cannot be that of an entertainer. The artist is not present because he is an artist (the creator of a body of work)—he is present because the most important thing is to be present. And he is present because he is responsible for everything, he is the concierge and the usher, the cleaning staff, the guarantor of his work: he is there to settle everything, to resolve everything. The artist is responsible for everything and even for what he cannot control or predict: this is why he must be present. I must be responsible for that for which I am not responsible. This is the noble task of my work and my presence. The artist is present to give of his time, the artist shares his time, the artist is present because there is nothing more important to do. The artist has nothing else—nothing more important—to do elsewhere. I was present beside my work for over three months in the Bijlmer neighbourhood, night and day without a break, because this was where the important thing for me was taking place, there was nothing more important to do anywhere else. That is the commitment and the sense of my presence. Presence is also an act of solitude, for I must be able to be alone, due to the complexity of my project, its irreducibility, its placement, its exaggeration, and its possible becoming. It is only by being alone that I can really be present and not make "just another project": personally, I don't think in these terms—I couldn't—for a project like *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* requires such a high level of commitment, of open-mindedness, of strength, and energy, that it would never have come to fruition if I had considered it as "just another project."

The difference between a cultural event and *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* is not in production, the thing produced, whether it is a reading, a seminar, or a workshop.

The fundamental difference is the autonomy of the work that affirms itself and the audience it addresses. I'm interested in this exactness: the simultaneous affirmation of the Autonomy and the universality of the work and the "non-exclusive" audience for which the production of the work is intended. It is not a production specifically adapted to a different audience, it is a production for a "non-exclusive audience." According to me, this means that the production must be able to address an uninterested audience. That the production is not there to satisfy a demand, that it is not trying to find "its" audience and that it is not trying to be a success in terms of the size of the audience or a specific audience. The production—without any concessions—remains an affirmation and something autonomous. Insisting upon that is what makes the difference. The more I insist upon it, the more exact it is. For it must also be possible to make this production without an audience, which was the case during some days of *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* nobody was there! This is possible when the production is based on love. The work is done with the inhabitants, in a gesture of love. Therefore, this gesture doesn't necessarily call for an answer—since it comes from me—this is both utopian and concrete. I want to create a new form, based on love for a "non-exclusive audience." And the form itself is the difference and the act that distinguishes it from a cultural event. My love for Spinoza is the love of philosophy, of things I don't understand, the love of the infinitude of thought. It is a question of sharing this, of affirming it, defending it, and giving it shape.

I agree with you that it is not a question of getting people to "move." I have never used the term of "participative art" in referring to my work—that is a meaningless term, because someone looking at an Ingres painting, for instance, is participating. He can participate without anyone noticing. Similarly, I never used the terms "educational art" and "community art." And my work has never had anything to do with "relational aesthetics." Nor have I read the book about it. If certain superficial critics put me in this category of "relational aesthetics," it is simply an inaccurate representation of what I do. Not a single one of my works in public space has been a project of "relational aesthetics" for the simple reason that I want to create a relationship with the Other only if that Other has no specific relationship with aesthetics. This is—and has always been—my guideline: to create a form that involves the other, the unexpected, the uninterested, those who don't see any interest in it, that involves a neighbour, a stranger, an alien. I have always wanted to work for this "non-exclusive" audience, it is one of my most important goals. To address yourself to a "non-exclusive" audience means to face the real, failure, lack of success, the cruelty of disinterest, and the incommensurability of a complex situation. But it also includes those who love art, the specialists, and those for whom art is important. My work includes them as part of that "non-exclusive" audience, without specifically targeting them. I know that as an artist I am always suspected (of making "relational aesthetics," for instance). That's fine with me—I'm not complaining—for I must be the "usual suspect," but that is precisely

why what is truly "suspect" must be clarified. What is "suspect" is to reign supreme in my role as the "usual suspect." This is why I want to try to define my work with my own notions, like "Presence and Production" and "non-exclusive audience." I am conscious that these notions are not perfect, ideal, or even accurate, but how can you accurately define art work in a single word? These notions are not concepts, they are tools I invented for myself and that I built myself.

The notion "marginal" is not accurate or exact either, I admit, and its use can be stereotyped and also sterile. Therefore I don't want to exploit it, manipulate it, or turn it into politics. I want to be more precise and clearer. I hadn't found an appropriate term to explain my experience at *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* to you and it's true that we need to look more closely into this question and position regarding the margin. Moved by the experience I was having, I tried to give a name to something that I was thinking and grasping, and with which I was in agreement. But the difficulty for me is to give a name to an experience—if it is a real experience, something new—to understand it and speak of this thing that is new. This thing was coexistence. I want to be more rigorous in describing my experience. As rigorous as my work is—I hope. The difficulty is that as an artist, I must refuse to analyse my work before achieving it and experimenting with it. This is where the problem lies—and I'm not trying to avoid it—but you must understand that the artist must first do the work before he analyses it. This has always been my guideline: do first, analyse after. I call it acting "headless." I'm conscious that with *The Bijlmer Spinoza-Festival* or other projects acting "headless" can be interpreted as a lack of rigour, but I think that it is the price to pay—as an artist—to do the work "headless." This is also why I believe my work deserves to be discussed in a critical manner, at a level that would include—for once—these questions in their paradoxical and problematic dimension. For I, who am neither theorist nor "practitioner," must go beyond argumentation in order to be able to create a form, a form that comes from me and only from me. I want to make my work in "low control." Acting in "low control" means to refuse to control, to put myself at a level of "low control" like someone on the ground, at the end of his rope, overwhelmed, totally out of his depth yet not resigned, not reconciled, and not cynical.

Thomas Hirschhorn



Dear Thomas Hirschhorn,

Since we have limited space, I won't ask you any new questions, which would remain unanswered. I just want to point out what strikes me in your answer, in order to open the way to other reflections. First of all, the term "responsibility." It seems to me that this term was already at the heart of the experience of the *Musée Précaire Albinet*. The Musée was placed under the responsibility—also day and night—of neighbourhood youth, who had to fill every function, both practical and intellectual, required by a museum. This amounted to scrambling the usual relationship between activity and passivity, which is always conceived as the reversal of symmetrical positions. And perhaps we have here a more interesting interpretation of "everyone is an artist" than that which puts a paintbrush in the viewer's hand or tries to bring the spectator on stage. Sharing, that is to say re-sharing, touching upon the normal distribution of spaces and times is something other than reversing. And of course the artist isn't a good soul, he is first someone who produces, and this production does not allow itself to be dissolved in the simple creation of a relationship with others. I am struck by the fact that you insist so strongly both on the autonomy of production and the taking into account of an Other who goes beyond any system prepared to receive him. It strikes me because it also leads me to think about my own presuppositions. I have always adhered to Flaubert's requirement that the author withdraw from his work. Where it was customary to denounce an omniscient position and an aristocratic negation of the other, I always saw, on the contrary, the condition for an emancipation of the reader and the spectator, to whom the author abandons his work, by giving him the freedom and the responsibility to appropriate in his own way a work that no longer belongs to the one who made it. "Absence" then seemed the appropriate complement to "production." Your watchword calls this pattern into question. It links production with the risk of the presence that verifies the effects while these have never been the object of any calculation. It links production and presence beyond the usual figures of generosity that exiles itself from art venues to reach the "non-audience" or beyond a sacrificial exposure to the cruelty of the one to whom we come, powerless. It may seem contradictory to create a form that involves an Other while affirming one's own production, without concession, without the need for a response. The answer might be that the two terms imply the presence of a third party that includes both of them and takes them beyond themselves. A Spinoza Festival, a Deleuze Monument, Twenty-Four Hours for Foucault: this means bringing into a contained time and space a power of thought, a power of community in which both the artist's absolutely determined, absolutely autonomous proposition and the unpredictable participation of a "non-exclusive audience," an audience without specificity, can be included. The autonomous and the non-exclusive then both appear as two forms of universality that are linked not in the dual relationship of the encounter but because the proposition itself is already permeated by this power of universality and otherness that I call "presupposition of the equality of intelligences" and which you refer to as the "love of the infinitude of thought."

Jacques Rancière

AMBASSADOR'S CORNER NOTE # 14 BY YASMIL RAYMOND

I'm beginning to see that the role of "ambassador" is already having a subtle modification from the earlier conceptualization. Although questions concerning art and culture continue to come up, the majority of the conversations have been extending into topics such as unemployment, immigration, and the problems of political leadership. I was in the library when a visitor walked in and introduced himself in Spanish as Felipe and added, "I am a communist and I love Gramsci." He described how he watched the construction of the monument from his apartment window but had to travel to Boston to visit family and missed the last weeks. He admitted that he was surprised when he saw the graffiti with a portrait of Antonio Gramsci, "one of my heroes," as he called him. Soon after we found a shade in a corner of the "Antonio Lounge" and talked about his past involvement in education and politics, his professorship at the public university UASD (Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo), his role in worker's study circles and the fact that he has been living in New York for the past years unable to find a way to learn English. As it often happens during these interplay of contradictions, we are confronted with the dictatorship of inequality and the potentiality of collective consciousness.



A DAILY LECTURE FROM MARCUS STEINWEG

21st Lecture at the Gramsci Monument, The Bronx, NYC: 21st July 2013

REALISM VERSUS IDEALISM

Marcus Steinweg

At least two ideologies need to be rebutted: on the one hand, the naturalist ideology, the phantasm of authenticity and purity, which cleaves to the cult of immediacy and the belief in the unmediated; on the other hand, the masochistic submission to fact. The masochist to fact is a subject that resembles Nietzsche's last man; his disappointment becomes absolute; it is, to him, religion after religion, a substitute for belief in which he invests his libido. The gesture of Adorno's thinking is always this double gesture, rejecting simple realism and simple idealism in favor of expanded concepts of both realism and idealism, in the name of what he gives us to think as an implicit incommensurability, in favor of a being that "amounts to more than what is, to more than the empirical." For "what is essential to art is that which in it is not the case, that which is incommensurable with the empirical measure of all things," as it marks the introjection of the new into the familiar, as an invention amid what already is, creative: "art is actually the world once over, as like it as it is unlike it."¹


Adorno uses the Wittgensteinian trope of what is the case to determine the already determined, which he associates with the immanence of culture, i.e., what already exists. The *back to nature* (or to the original rule of *phusis*) obfuscates nature's mediacy. It befits the pathos of any ontology (Adorno, of course, is thinking first and foremost of Heidegger) that aims at the "subject area of the pure,"² at the immediate that functions at the center of any ideological construction as its stabilizer. Against it we must insist on the mediacy of the natural: "In the universally mediated world everything experienced in primary terms is culturally preformed. Whoever wants the other has to start with the immanence of culture, in order to break out through it."³




Such breaking out is what art and philosophy have in common. Both art and philosophy are about being taken in neither by naturalist purism nor by the no less ideological culturalism as they do not cease to drill holes into the immanence of what already exists.

ART SCHOOL 3 BY THOMAS HIRSCHHORN

Art-School 3
Friday, July 19th


	The Work of DJ BD	The Work of Marcella	The Work of Zoe	The Work of Mak	The Work of Toana	The Work of Jedda	The Work of Nasja	The Work of Emu
The Judgment of DJ BD	X	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES
Jugment of Marcella	No	X	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
Jugment of Zoe	Yes	YES	X	No	YES	YES	YES	YES
Jugment of Mak	Yes	YES	YES	X	YES	YES	YES	YES
Jugment of Toana	No	YES	YES	YES	X	YES	NO	NO
Jugment of Jedda	No	YES	YES	YES	YES	X	NO	NO
Jugment of NASJA	Yes	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	X	NO
Jugment of EMU	Yes	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	X







RESIDENT OF THE DAY



VINCENT CONYERS

