

**61st Lecture at the Gramsci Monument, The Bronx, NYC: 29th August 2013**  
**THE SUBJECT OF ART**  
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1. How is the place of the art work within the social field to be determined?
2. How do the production of art, art criticism, art studies, and philosophy relate to one another?
3. Is there a political commission for an artwork?
4. Is art necessarily critical—critical of institutions, the market, ideology?
5. Or does an artwork put certain limits upon criticism and its good conscience, which make of it a risky, necessarily affirmative practice?
6. Does its sense lie in these categories of resistance and subversion invariably associated with the artwork, but also in a self-calming that enables the artist to participate in the political game without genuine commitment, so that political consciousness takes on the function of a depoliticization that has not been admitted?
7. How affirmative must an artwork be in order to be subversive or political?
8. In order to be an assertion of form and truth, art and philosophy must refuse the "order of real politics."<sup>1</sup>
9. That is the order of the possible, of pragmatism and its practical cleverness, of situational intelligence.
10. It is the order of *phrónesis*, as Aristotle says, the dimension of diplomatic reason. Aristotle calls *phrónesis* intelligence in particularity, in unfreedom, intelligence that operates in relation to the situation in which it decides and acts.
11. As Hans-Georg Gadamer ceaselessly underscored, it is the principle of hermeneutics, reason that ponders and weighs up.
12. That brings it close to the pragmatic estimation of *doxá*, of sound common sense.
13. Art and philosophy have an inherent absolute resistance to *doxá* and *phrónesis* because they compel the subject to decelerate, to brake itself, to renounce power.
14. Philosophy and art want to erect the subject as a power of assertion that resists defusing by *doxá* and *phrónesis*.
15. The subject truly decides and acts only by neglecting its situation, ignoring and transcending it by puncturing the texture of facts.

16. Subject is nothing other than the name for this puncturing and hyperbole, which it necessarily represents.
17. Hence the mistrust of a subject of such self-authorization because it resists its own defusing by the spirit of facts.
- 18.
- 19.

1 Alain Badiou, Metapolitics, trans. Jason Barker (London: Verso, 2003), 110.