


THE GRAMSCI MONUMENT- NEWSPAPER



"A periodical, like a newspaper, a book, or any other medium of didactic expression that is aimed at a certain level of the reading or listening public, cannot satisfy everyone equally; not everyone will find it useful to the same degree. The important thing is that it serves as a stimulus for everyone; after all, no publication can replace the thinking mind."
Antonio Gramsci
(Prison Notebook B)



July 9th, 2013 - Forest Houses, Bronx, NY

The Gramsci Monument-Newspaper is part of the "Gramsci Monument", an artwork by Thomas Hirschhorn, produced by Dia Art Foundation in co-operation with Erik Farmer and the Residents of Forest Houses

GREAT MINDS DO THINK ALIKE !!!!!!!



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
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



88°F | °C

Precipitation: 30%
Humidity: 53%
Wind: 10 mph

Temperature	Precipitation	Wind
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HOW WERE THEY CONNECTED??



“The mark which has dominated all my work is this longing for life, this sense of exclusion, which doesn't lessen but augments this love of life.”

Loving Your Enemies (November 1957)

— Pier Paolo Pasolini

Delivered at Dexter Avenue Baptist Church, Montgomery, Alabama, on 17 November 1957.

• Far from being the pious injunction of a utopian dreamer, this command is an absolute necessity for the survival of our civilization. Yes, **it is love that will save our world and our civilization, love even for enemies.**

• How do you go about loving your enemies? I think the first thing is this: **In order to love your enemies, you must begin by analyzing self.** And I'm sure that seems strange to you, that I start out telling you this morning that you love your enemies by beginning with a look at self. It seems to me that that is the first and foremost way to come to an adequate discovery to the how of this situation. ... some people aren't going to like you. **They're going to dislike you, not because of something that you've done to them, but because of various jealous reactions and other reactions that are so prevalent in human nature.** But after looking at these things and admitting these things, we must face the fact that an individual might dislike us because of something that we've done deep down in the past, some personality attribute that we possess, something that we've done deep down in the past and we've forgotten about it; but it was that something that aroused the hate response within the individual. That is why I say, begin with yourself. **There might be something within you that arouses the tragic hate response in the other individual.**

• The success of communism in the world today is due to the failure of democracy to live up to the noble ideals and principles inherent in its system. And this is what Jesus means when he said: "How is it that you can see the mote in your brother's eye and not see the beam in your own eye?" Or to put it in Moffatt's translation: "How is it that you see the splinter in your brother's eye and fail to see the plank in your own eye?" And this is one of the tragedies of human nature. So we begin to love our enemies and love those persons that hate us whether in collective life or individual life by looking at ourselves. And this is one of the tragedies of human nature. So we begin to love our enemies and love those persons that hate us whether in collective life or individual life by looking at ourselves

“The point of modernity is to live a life without illusions while not becoming disillusioned”

— Antonio Gramsci

• **THEY WERE CONNECTED BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT SEGREGATION WAS INJUSTICE TO PEOPLE. THEY FELT THAT ALL PEOPLE NO MATTER WHAT RACE, RELIGION OR SEX SHOULD BE TREATED EQUALLY.**

ON SEGREGATION

Segregation is that which is forced upon inferiors by superiors. Separation is done voluntarily by two equals... The Negro schools in the Negro community are controlled by whites... the economy of the Negro community is controlled by whites. And since the Negro... community is controlled or regulated by outsiders, it is a segregated community... Muslims who follow the Honorable Elijah Muhammad are as much against segregation as we are against integration. We are against segregation because it is unjust and we are against integration because [it is] a false solution to a real problem.

Malcolm X, Harlem, June 1964

Malcolm X, WLST interview, May 1963

“BODIES IN ALLIANCE AND THE POLITICS OF THE STREET”

JUDITH BULTER



Just to be clear: I am not referring to a vitalism or a right to life as such. Rather, I am suggesting that political claims are made by bodies as they appear and act, as they refuse and as they persist under conditions in which that fact alone is taken to be an act of delegitimation of the state. It is not that bodies are simply mute life-forces that counter existing modalities of power. Rather, they are themselves modalities of power, embodied interpretations, engaging in allied action. On the one hand, these bodies are productive and performative. On the other hand, they can only persist and act when they are supported, by environments, by nutrition, by work, by modes of sociality and belonging. And when these supports fall away, they are mobilized in another way, seizing upon the supports that exist in order to make a claim that there can be no embodied life without social and institutional support, without ongoing employment, without networks of interdependency and care. They struggle not only for the idea of social support and political enfranchisement, but their struggle takes on a social form of its own. And so, in the most ideal instances, an alliance enacts the social order it seeks to bring about, but when this happens, and it does happen, we have to be mindful of two important caveats. The first is that the alliance is not reducible to individuals, and it is not individuals who act. The second is that action in alliance happens precisely between those who participate, and this is not an ideal or empty space – it is the space of support itself – of durable and liveable material environments and of interdependency among living beings. I will move toward this last idea toward the end of my remarks this evening. But let us return to the demonstrations, in their logic and in their instances.

It is not only that many of the massive demonstrations and modes of resistance we have seen in the last months produce a space of appearance, they also seize upon an already established space permeated by existing power, seeking to sever the relation between the public space, the public square, and the existing regime. So

the limits of the political are exposed, and the link between the theatre of legitimacy and public space is severed; that theatre is no longer unproblematically housed in public space, since public space now occurs in the midst of another action, one that displaces the power that claims legitimacy precisely by taking over the field of its effects. Simply put, the bodies on the street redeploy the space of appearance in order to contest and negate the existing forms of political legitimacy – and just as they sometimes fill or take over public space, the material history of those structures also work on them, and become part of their very action, remaking a history in the midst of its most concrete and sedimented artifices. These are subjugated and empowered actors who seek to wrest legitimacy from an existing state apparatus that depends upon the public space of appearance for its theatrical self-constitution. In wresting that power, a new space is created, a new “between” of bodies, as it were, that lays claim to existing space through the action of a new alliance, and those bodies are seized and animated by those existing spaces in the very acts by which they reclaim and resignify their meanings.

For this contestation to work, there has to be a hegemonic struggle over what we are calling the space of appearance. Such a struggle intervenes in the spatial organization of power, which includes the allocation and restriction of spatial locations in which and by which any population may appear, which means that there is a spatial restriction on when and how the “popular will” may appear. This view of the spatial restriction and allocation of who may appear, in effect, who may become a subject of appearance, suggests an operation of power that works through both foreclosure and differential allocation. How is such an idea of power, and its corollary idea of politics, to be reconciled with the Arendtian proposition that politics requires not only entering into a space of appearance, but an active participation in the making of the space of appearance itself. And further, I would add, it requires a way of acting in the midst of being formed by that history and its material structures.

One can see the operation of a strong performative in Arendt's work – in acting, we bring the space of politics into being, understood as the space of appearance. It is a divine performative allocated to the human form. But as a result, she cannot account for the ways in which the established architecture and topographies of power act upon us, and enter into our very action sometimes foreclosing our entry into the political sphere, or making us differentially apparent within that sphere. And yet, to work within these two forms of power, we have to think about bodies in ways that Arendt does not do, and we have to think about space as acting on us, even as we act within it, or even when sometimes our actions, considered as plural or collective, bring it into being.

If we consider what it is to appear, it follows that we appear to someone, and that our appearance has to be registered by the senses, not only our own, but someone else's, or some larger group. For the Arendtian position, it follows that to act and speak politically we must “appear” to one another in some way, that is to say, that to appear is always to appear for another, which means that for the body to exist politically, it has to assume a social dimension – it is comported outside itself and toward others in ways that cannot and do not ratify individualism. Assuming that we are living and embodied organisms when we speak and act, the organism assumes social and political form in the space of appearance. This does not mean that we overcome or negate some biological status to assume a social one; on the contrary, the organic bodies that we are require a sustaining social world in order to persist. And this means that as biological creatures who seek to persist, we are necessarily dependent on social relations and institutions that address the basic needs for food, shelter, and protection from violence, to name a few. No monadic body simply persists on its own, but if it persists, it is in the context of a sustaining set of relations. So if we approach the question of the bio-political in this way, we can see that the space of appearance does not belong to a sphere of politics separate from a sphere of survival and of need. When the question of the survival not only of individuals, but whole populations, is at issue, then the political issue has to do with whether and how a social and political formation addresses the demand to provide for basic needs such as shelter and food, and protection against violence. And the question for a critical and

contesting politics has to do with how basic goods are distributed, how life itself is allocated, and how the unequal distribution of the value and grievability of life is instituted by targeted warfare as well as systematic forms of exploitation or negligence, which render populations differentially precarious and disposable.

A quite problematic division of labor is at work in Arendt's position, which is why we must rethink her position for our times. If we appear, we must be seen, which means that our bodies must be viewed and their vocalized sounds must be heard: the body must enter the visual and audible field. But we have to ask why, if this is so, the body is itself divided into the one that appears publically to speak and act, and another, sexual and laboring, feminine, foreign and mute, that generally relegated to the private and pre-political sphere. That latter body operates as a precondition for appearance, and so becomes the structuring absence that governs and makes possible the public sphere. If we are living organisms who speak and act, then we are clearly related to a vast continuum or network of living beings; we not only live among them, but our persistence as living organisms depends on that matrix of sustaining interdependent relations. And yet, if our speaking and acting distinguishes us as something separate from that corporeal realm (raised earlier by the question of whether our capacity to think politically depends on one sort of physei or another), we have to ask how such a duality between action and body can be preserved if and when the "living" word and "actual" deed – both clearly political – so clearly presuppose the presence and action of a living human body, one whose life is bound up with other living processes. It may be that two senses of the body are at work for Arendt – one that appears in public, and another that is "sequestered" in private –, and that the public body is one that makes itself known as the figure of the speaking subject, one whose speech is also action. The private body never appears as such, since it is preoccupied with the repetitive labor of reproducing the material conditions of life. The private body thus conditions the public body, and even though they are the same body, the bifurcation is crucial to maintaining the public and private distinction. Perhaps this is a kind of fantasy that one dimension of bodily life can and must remain out of sight, and yet another, fully distinct, appears in public? But is there no trace of the biological that appears as such, and could we not argue, with Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers, that negotiating the sphere of appearance is a biological thing to do, since there is no way of navigating an environment or procuring food without appearing bodily in the world, and there is no escape from the vulnerability and mobility that appearing in the world implies? In other words, is appearance not a necessarily morphological moment where the body appears, and not only in order to speak and act, but also to suffer and to move, to engage others bodies, to negotiate an environment on which one depends? Indeed, the body can appear and signify in ways that contest the way it speaks, or even contest speaking as its paradigmatic instance. Indeed, could we still understand action, gesture, stillness, touch, and moving together, if they were all reducible to the vocalization of thought through speech?

Indeed, this act of public speaking, even within that problematic division of labour, *depends upon* a dimension of bodily life that is given, passive, opaque and so excluded from the realm of the political. Hence, we can ask, what regulation keeps the given body from spilling over into the active body? Are these two different bodies and what politics is required to keep them apart? Are these two different dimensions of the same body, or are these, in fact, the effect of a certain regulation of bodily appearance that is actively contested by new social movements, struggles against sexual violence, for reproductive freedom, against precarity, for the freedom of mobility? Here we can see that a certain topographical or even architectural regulation of the body happens at the level of theory. Significantly, it is precisely this operation of power – foreclosure and differential allocation of whether and how the body may appear – which is excluded from Arendt's explicit account of the political. Indeed, her explicit account of the political depends upon that very operation of power that it fails to consider as part of politics itself.

So what I accept is the following: Freedom does not come from me or from you; it can and does happen as a

relation between us or, indeed, among us. So this is not a matter of finding the human dignity within each person, but rather of understanding the human as a relational and social being, one whose action depends upon equality and articulates the principle of equality. Indeed, there is no human on her view if there is no equality. No human can be human alone. And no human can be human without acting in concert with others and on conditions of equality. I would add the following: The claim of equality is not only spoken or written, but is made precisely when bodies appear together or, rather, when, through their action, they bring the space of appearance into being. This space is a feature and effect of action, and it only works, according to Arendt, when relations of equality are maintained.

Of course, there are many reasons to be suspicious of idealized moments, but there are also reasons to be wary of any analysis that is fully guarded against idealization. There are two aspects of the revolutionary demonstrations in Tahrir square that I would like to underscore. The first has to do with the way a certain sociability was established within the square, a division of labor that broke down gender difference, that involved rotating who would speak and who would clean the areas where people slept and ate, developing a work schedule for everyone to maintain the environment and to clean the toilets. In short, what some would call "horizontal relations" among the protestors formed easily and methodically, and quickly it seemed that relations of equality, which included an equal division of labour between the sexes, became part of the very resistance to Mubarek's regime and its entrenched hierarchies, including the extraordinary differentials of wealth between the military and corporate sponsors of the regime, and the working people. So the social form of the resistance began to incorporate principles of equality that governed not only how and when people spoke and acted for the media and against the regime, but how people cared for their various quarters within the square, the beds on pavement, the makeshift medical stations and bathrooms, the places where people ate, and the places where people were exposed to violence from the outside. These actions were all political in the simple sense that they were breaking down a conventional distinction between public and private in order to establish relations of equality; in this sense, they were incorporating into the very social form of resistance the principles for which they were struggling on the street.

Secondly, when up against violent attack or extreme threats, many people chanted the word "silmiyya" which comes from the root verb (salima) which means to be safe and sound, unharmed, unimpaired, intact, safe, and secure; but also, to be unobjectionable, blameless, faultless; and yet also, to be certain, established, clearly proven^[1]. The term comes from the noun "silm" which means "peace" but also, interchangeably and significantly, "the religion of Islam." One variant of the term is "Hubb as-silm" which is Arabic for "pacifism." Most usually, the chanting of "Silmiyya" comes across as a gentle exhortation: "peaceful, peaceful." Although the revolution was for the most part non-violent, it was not necessarily led by a principled opposition to violence. Rather, the collective chant was a way of encouraging people to resist the mimetic pull of military aggression – and the aggression of the gangs – by keeping in mind the larger goal – radical democratic change. To be swept into a violent exchange of the moment was to lose the patience needed to realize the revolution. What interests me here is the chant, the way in which language worked not to incite an action, but to restrain one. A restraint in the name of an emerging community of equals whose primary way of doing politics would not be violence.

Of course, Tahrir Square is a place, and we can locate it quite precisely on the map of Cairo. At the same time, we find questions posed throughout the media: will the Palestinians have their Tahrir square? Where is the Tahrir Square in India? To name but a few. So it is located, and it is transposable; indeed, it seemed to be transposable from the start, though never completely. And, of course, we cannot think the transposability of those bodies in the square without the media. In some ways, the media images from Tunisia prepared the way for the media events in Tahrir, and then those that followed in Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, and Libya, all of which took different trajectories, and take them still. As you know many of the public demonstrations of these last months

(TO BE CONTINUED ISSUE #10)

Under the Skies Above

After the Miscarriage

My child is out there somewhere
under the skies above
waiting anxiously 4 u and me
2 bless it with our love
A part of me a part of u
and a part of this love we share
will protect my unborn child
who lives dormant out there somewhere
Sometimes in my dreams
I imagine what it would be like
How could I properly guide him
when even I don't know what's right
Whether he is born in wealth or poverty
there will be no deficiency in love
I welcome this gift of life
given from GOD under the skies above

- Tupac Shakur

AMBASSDOR'S CORNER YASMIL RAYMOND NOTE #6

Ambassador's Note 6

Raymond, Yasmil

Sent: Monday, July 08, 2013 9:33 AM


To: Thomas Hirschhorn [ThomasHirschhorn@aol.com]

Cc: romainlopez@gmail.com

Early last week two elderly women stopped by the desk outside the ambassador's office. I was about to have an apple when the more senior of the pair said in English, "Antonio was the name of my late husband." A few minutes later we were conversing speedily through various topics, Gramsci, New York, and Forest Houses. They introduced themselves and explained that they emigrated from Puerto Rico in the late 1940s and have lived in the community for the past 50 years. To acknowledge our commonality, I switched to Spanish and shared that most of my family still lives in San Juan and the conversation continued in both languages. Mrs. Aponte mentioned that she observed the entire construction phase of the monument from her ground floor window and felt pity for the crew during the rainy days, which were many last month. Simply learning that she had been observing for the past six weeks made think of the inseparable role of action and response in the experience of art. The fact that Mrs. Aponte's had abandoned her "window view" and was now standing inside the monument talking with me was an encouraging response, a form of feedback. Minutes later I will learn that the two women were deaf and our conversation was mediated through their superb lipreading skills.





MORE ABOUT GRAMSCI



Facing page:

Top: 17. A directive from the Ministry of Justice, dated November 13, 1930, to the warden of Turi prison granting Gramsci permission to read the books mentioned below, including Fülöp-Miller's book on Bolshevism and Trotsky's autobiography. At the lower left are the protocol number 3044 and Gramsci's prison identification number at Turi, 7047.

Bottom: 18. The cover of a pamphlet published in 1933 or 1934 written by the French novelist Romain Rolland. Under Gramsci's name are the words *Those who are dying in Mussolini's prisons*. The pamphlet was translated and distributed in many countries.



19. The building in Formia that housed the Cusumano clinic, where Gramsci was a patient but still held under police guard from December 17, 1933, to August 24, 1935.

LETTERS FROM GRAMSCI

Dearest Tania,

January 19, 1927

On Monday, the seventeenth, the steamer did not arrive. I sent you a telegram, because when reading your letter of the eleventh I got the impression that you were more melancholy than usual and I did not want all communication between us to be cut off. I cannot understand why you are agitated and why you would think that I could possibly have left Ustica!¹ The fact that one of my postcards bore a Palermo postmark could not mean anything: if, for any reason whatever, I should have to leave I would immediately inform you by telegram, or have you informed by a friend.

JANUARY 1927 / 69

I thank you for the 500 lire you sent me; but that was too much. I absolutely don't want you to make so many sacrifices for me. I hope that this will tide me over for a few months and that I won't need to turn to anyone. The worst stage of internment, from a financial point of view, has passed: we've entered a period of stabilization, which will continue to consolidate, as gradually mess arrangements and supply services begin to function.

I would like to write to you at length, but it is already late. I will write at greater length next time. Meanwhile I would like to know that you are tranquil and serene. I embrace you affectionately.

Antonio

1. See letter to Tania, January 3, 1927, n. 2

January 20, 1927

Dear Tatiana,

I have at this very moment received orders to leave for my transfer to Milan. This is an ordinary transfer, that is, I will have to stop along the way, in the jails of Palermo, Naples, Rome, etc., unless I am able to convince them to grant me an extraordinary transfer that is more expeditious and less fraught with hardship. I will try to let you have this information by telegram. I believe that what is involved is a judicial procedure for one of the not so rare charges that result in a more or less brief acquittal. I send you my affectionate greetings.

Antonio

already exists and the new such that the work appears as the stage of an enactment of difference in which the established conception of art encounters an objection. At the same time, we must understand that a clear separation between what exists and the new remains a challenge that cannot be met: "Even the category of the new, which in the artwork represents what has yet to exist and that whereby the work transcends the given, bears the scar of the ever-same underneath the constantly new. Consciousness, fettered to this day, has not gained mastery over the new, not even in the image: Consciousness dreams of the new but is not able to dream the new itself."⁴ The work of art draws its power from its resistance against forces that reduce it to an effect of what already exists. The affirmative aspect of the work consists in its being open toward something beyond what already exists, something whose positivity it first generates. The experience of art is the experience of the conditions of its possibility as much as of the affront to these conditions the work represents. The concept of art condenses the paradox of a performance that must turn against its own possibilities for the sake of the impossible as the impossible that is possible within its realm. Art is what engenders a conception of art in the assertion of works that, as they resist assimilation to what already exists, articulate themselves as affirmations of contingency, as figures of an opening toward an indeterminate or incommensurable something that marks the truth of the space of fact. I call the universe of fact the dimension of a reality overdetermined by social, political, economic, historical, cultural, biological, technological, etc. factors. It is here that the work of art fights for its autonomy, in the field of factual codification and real heteronomy—a heteronomy the work remains at risk of falling back into—: "Artworks are able to appropriate their heterogeneous element, their entwinement with society, because they are themselves always at the same time something social. Nevertheless, art's autonomy, wrested painfully from society as well as socially derived in itself, has the potential of reversing into heteronomy; everything new is weaker than the accumulated ever-same, and it is ready to regress back into it."⁵

Art "refuses definition,"⁶ but it equally calls for one. Art hardly exists other than as the work on its concept, the work of determining what art is and ought to be. In opening up toward what it has long been embedded in, the dimension of constituted certainties and valencies, art urges toward the boundaries of the space of fact as much as that of its own concept and its previous manifestations. Part and parcel of art is a dynamism of its bringing itself forth through the works, the ongoing redefinition of what its concept encompasses. Art expands the concept of art by blurring the boundaries that separate it from its *other*, from what delimits it. Every work of art is a form of boundary-blurring, an excess directed at its implicit inconsistency;⁷ an excess that marks the blurring of its boundary toward its boundary.

Bilder, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 2003, 226–31. Adorno himself noted that the idea of regarding "each codified philosophy as a force field" was inspired by Kracauer; see Theodor W. Adorno, *Noten zur Literatur III*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1965, 84.

4 Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, 311.

5 *Ibid.*, 310.

6 *Ibid.*, 2.

7 A form of boundary-blurring, and nonetheless a form. Because the "transcendence of form" is the form of the work of art, it remains threatened by what Adorno calls the "Romantic principle" (in music, on which Adorno draws for many of his examples, this "Romantic principle" is characteristic in particular of Schumann, but also of Gustav Mahler and Alban Berg): "the act of giving or throwing oneself away" that leads to an abdication of self as much as a loss of form: the "more-than-form" becomes a "lack of form." The true assertion of form, by contrast, opens up, as form, toward formlessness only to simultaneously oppose it. This opening-up toward chaos without being lost in it is exactly what Deleuze and Guattari have defined as the mission of art (as well as philosophy and science). Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, *Beethoven. Philosophie der Musik*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 2004, 115 and 224; and Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, trans. Graham Burchell, Huoah Tomlinson, London: Verso 1994.

its being-open to the formlessness whose medium it remains. Art is an assertion of form that engenders itself in an opening toward the formless.⁸ Be such formlessness that of society, as an excessively complex and internally contradictory space of fact—the zone of socio-historico-symbolic evidence—be it the point of inconsistency of this domain, the incommensurability commensurable to it.

The affirmation of the work of art is the affirmation of its polemic violence, which turns against everything that constrains its aspiration to autonomy: the constituted reality in its complexity and variety, what Adorno calls *society*. There is art only in the here and now of the one world without exit: the world of fact. Art is not an escape from it; it frames its aspiration to autonomy amid the world of determiners in order to escape in an opening toward heteronomy its phantasmatic failure to coincide with itself. Just as freedom exists only under the conditions of *de facto* unfreedom and self-possession only under those of its absence, autonomy becomes a demand and a necessity only in the field of *de facto* heteronomy. Adorno never ceases to insist on the possibility of *aesthetic autonomy* in its opening toward its own impossibility. This renders him the advocate of a possible impossibility. Part and parcel of art is its "rejection of empirical reality." Art departs the "empirical world" not by fleeing into a second, a higher world but by intensifying its relation to this one. The "affirmative essence"⁹ of art must turn against its own distorted image, against the idealist temptation to locate art somewhere beyond the world of fact. Affirmation is not naïveté or approbation. Affirmation is invention and construction. The affirmative intensity of the work of art includes a double gesture that encompasses the acknowledgment of its historicity as much as the courage to forgo self-satisfied self-enclosure in a critical-reflective assurance of its status as a resultant, a double gesture that demands an opening toward the inconsistency in the fabric of determiners. Facts are nothing but facts, states of affairs only states of affairs: art knows that knowledge is not everything, that the artist's responsibility begins with building affirmative resistance to all vulgar materialisms and positivisms while also suspending all idealisms that promise to it the existence of a reality beyond this, the only one, for that way lies its total dehistoricization. Realism or idealism: the alternative is deceptive—in the history of philosophy, in philosophical aesthetics, in art.

A "concept of history [...] as a critique of philosophy" that "does not seek to abandon philosophy itself,"¹⁰ as Adorno and Horkheimer write in the preface to the second edition of their *Dialectics of the Enlightenment*, has its counterpart in the effort "to transcend the concept" "by way of the concept,"¹¹ as well as in a conception of art that, in the face of its impossibility (heteronomy, historicity), gains insight into its possibility (autonomy, universality). What holds for the concept of a true human being also holds for the true work of art: "He would be neither a mere function of a whole, which is inflicted upon him so thoroughly that he cannot distinguish himself from it anymore, nor would he simply retrench himself in his pure selfhood."¹² It is amid this tension between immanence and transcendence that the concept of art has its place as much as that of the subject: porous toward the totality of social fact as well as its inconsistency, for to touch this inconsistency is to seize the possibility of autonomy

8 Cf. Marcus Steinweg, *Behauptungsphilosophie*, Berlin: Merve 2006.

9 Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, 2.

10 Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, "Preface to the New Edition (1969)," in *Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments*, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford UP 2002, xii.

11 Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E.B. Ashton, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1973, 15.

12 Theodor W. Adorno, *Critical Models. Interventions and Catchwords*, trans. Henry W. Pickford, New York: Columbia UP 1998, 165.

and freedom. This is the affirmation the work of art performs, the acknowledgment of itself as an element of the empirical world as much as the figure of an opposition resistant to it.

The work of art stands its ground amid a world to which it cannot assimilate. The act of *creatio* is not so much a heroic act as one of embarrassment. "Go with art into your very own narrowness. And set yourself free".¹³ the sentence from Paul Celan's Meridian speech articulates this, if we may say so, encouraging embarrassment. It is indispensable that we tie the work of art to the category of courage; but the courage whose manifestation is the work is not the courage of a subject that remains within the field of its possibilities. This subject would already be discouraged, for it knows nothing but possibilities, nothing but options, nothing but realities, nothing but freedoms that are none. The freedom of setting-onself-free of which Celan speaks is a different one. It is the freedom of a subject that does not know absolute freedom; freedom in the objective unfreedom of freedoms on offer and sold, by the power of fact, as alternatives. To go into one's very own narrowness means to resist these alternatives, to seek out the utmost recess of one's possibilities, the edge of the zone of fact; and to see here, touching upon the wall of the impossible, nothing more than this wall, this narrowness. Only here, in the experience of this blindness and narrowness, can something like a setting-onself-free take place, in a transcendence of optional freedoms toward the freedom of the blind assertion of form. The assertion of form that is the work of art is an expression of affirmative resistance. It is affirmative to the extent that it acknowledges the limitations of the world of fact, including its imperatives of freedom, but it refuses to sacrifice to this acknowledgment the freedom of an assertion of form that remains an act of embarrassment. The world as it is cannot but daunt and embarrass. It reduces its subjects to operators in an already decided space of fact. Yet this reduction, which is unacceptable to any subject that asserts and maintains its subjecthood, generates energies of resistance, of embarrassment and aporia. We might describe the aporia within the established paths, the embarrassment in which the subject experiences the limitations of the real, as a critical element. Inherent to it, at least, is the possibility of stepping outside the field of reductive facts. As soon as there is embarrassment, there is something like dissatisfaction with the organization of the real, with the picture the world forms of itself. The subject of art is embarrassed also because this picture itself lacks all embarrassment, because it denies the possibility of being embarrassed, believing in itself as though in a matter of fact. What becomes apparent in embarrassment is the difference between fact and truth in all its irreconcilability. Facts are nothing but facts, while truths remain stopgaps born of embarrassment, born of the subject's unwillingness to come to an arrangement with the facts. Here lies the resistance of the work of art: in its refusal to sacrifice to the powers of fact its embarrassment over their faith in themselves.

Art was never anything but acquiescence to the fragility of its time. Art does not emerge from a stable situation; it is the experience of the inconsistency of its reality. Art exists only as the experience that the system of fact has holes. That is why there cannot be for art an alliance with the facts, which is not to say that it denies or fails to apprehend their power. Only it amounts to more than the demonstration of this non-misapprehension, more than the analytical force that is also part of it. As long as art does not transcend its knowledge, it is not art. It would be nothing but self-assurance on the part of the subject within the fabric of a critical commentary on its situation.

13

Paul Celan, "Der Meridian" (speech on occasion of his acceptance of the Georg Büchner Prize, October 22, 1960), in: *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 3, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1986, 200.

Only with the assertion of form that eludes narcissistic self-assurance by articulating the transitoriness of the certainties of fact does art succeed in confronting the universal inconsistency that is the subject's true time and its true place.¹⁴ Rather than being a document of its time, the work of art is the corruption of the *zeitgeist* as much as the historico-social texture from which it nonetheless emerges. A work that would be nothing but the result of its conditions, reducible to its determiners, would not be a work. It remains the distinguishing mark of the work of art that it inscribes a resistance into the reality of which it is part by appearing within it as incommensurable to it. What distances it from the document is this excess that alienates it from its factuality, by indicating the ontological fragility of the texture of fact. The assertion of form on the part of the work of art neither denies its origins nor its existence in the world of fact; it simply resists being reduced to it by appearing within it as something unforeseen. The appearance of the work proves it to be the site of an antagonism between what already is and what threatens to topple it. Whereas the document by definition transmits, communicates, and archives information, the work of art is the act of calling information, communication, and archiving into question. The insistence "that the arts cannot be subsumed under an unbroken identity of art"¹⁵ indicates, first and foremost, that such an unbroken identity does not exist. By practicing the permanent re-destabilization of all forms and concepts, art compels the formation of an individual concept adequate to each work, a concept whose generality finds its corrective in the singularity of the individual work while gesturing beyond it toward its universality.

14

To be a subject means to transcend the horizon of fact in order to give space, in the assertion of a new form—the form of the subject—to a primordial diremption that is the truth of the subject. I call this diremption the incommensurability of a life that, as the life of a subject, reaches beyond its subject-representation in the field of aesthetic, social, political, and cultural evidence. The subject does not articulate this distance after the fact; it *is* nothing but the distance it articulates from the authority of fact.

15

Theodor W. Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie* (= *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 7), Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1970, 11. Cf. Adorno, *Ästhetik Theor.* 3.

SCENE 3: SPECTERS

(The location of the scenes is to be announced by an actor holding up a sign, in this case "GYM.")

Enter: Müller, Derrida, Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger, Deleuze, Gramsci

MÜLLER
My theory is an economy of the dead.
The dead are in the majority.
The dead are not dead.

DERRIDA
We live with specters.

NIETZSCHE
The fact that God is dead doesn't mean that he doesn't exist.

FOUCAULT
God is dead means that a man once died.

MÜLLER
Man is an abyss.

HEIDEGGER (quoting Hölderlin)
That is, mortals almost/Reach into the abyss.

MÜLLER
Man stands on the verge.

NIETZSCHE
Who wipes off the blood?

FOUCAULT
Specters have no blood.

NIETZSCHE
God is dead means:
He looks different now.

DELEUZE
In costume?

HEIDEGGER
God is money.

NIETZSCHE
Money is a God who doesn't need any money.

MÜLLER
God is money, money shits.
God shits like mad.

GRAMSCI
Money destroys itself.

MÜLLER
That's what it's for!

GRAMSCI
To generate something new.

MÜLLER
To simulate the future.

NIETZSCHE
To create specters.

GRAMSCI
Money is inventive.

DELEUZE
Money is shitty creative!

NIETZSCHE
Creativity used to be God's privilege.

MÜLLER
Then art's.

GRAMSCI
Now the economy's.

GRAMSCI THEATER

WRITTEN BY MARCUS

STEINWEG

MATERIAL 3: THE DEATH OF GOD

The death of God undermines the idea of an absolute programmer. There there is no one who knows. No one has a plan, that is, everyone has nothing but an individual plan, and doubts about its consistency. The subject without God is not its own proprietor. It constitutes itself as an inventor in the unintelligible terrain that is its life. One can speak of a subject when the willingness appears to substitute auto-invention for the esotericism of self-search, in other words, when the subject has enough courage to address itself as something other than an object.

RESIDENT OF THE
DAY!!!!!!



HAPPY BIRTHDAY DJ BABY-
DEE!!!!